What is the GRPO?

A journalist friend of mine is trying to get some answers from the Icelandic police in relation to a stated liaison between GRPO and the Iceland police. The USA embassy claims it doesnt know that the GRPO is (lol) and I want to ask the Icelandic police about this liaison at a meeting in the parliament. Would be very useful to know what this stands for. Cant find anything useful online, so forget about google. We need your help, if you know how to decode this.

¶D.  (S/NF) Iceland does not have an intelligence service. 
The National Security Unit (NSU) within the National 
Commissioner's Office handles threat information analysis. 
The NSU is comprised of three individuals.  The NSU is too 
small to undertake any type of intelligence gathering role 
and responds to threats as they arise, such as threats 
against Icelandic officials, demonstrations/protests, and 
"extremist" groups.  The NSU is not a tradecraft or covert 
group.  There are no terrorism-related examples, but the 
NSU's investigative and analytical capabilities have been 
demonstrated through operations in varying fields of law 
enforcement such as organized crime (OC), counterintelligence 
(CI), and counter-narcotics (CN).  GRPO maintains liaison 
with the NSU. 
 
¶E.  (SBU) Law enforcement agencies, including the NSU, have 
been very cooperative with US Embassy requests for 
information and support. 
 

Random Cables where the GRPO is mentioned to get some context:


“Two separate GRPO sources, one highly credible, have alleged that Patiño obtained and managed Venezuelan funds for Correa’s campaign. An uncorroborated report from a GRPO source indicated that Patiño also solicited funds from the FARC for Correa’s campaign,” the cable reads.



„On December 15-16, 2009, Treasury Department 

Acting Assistant Secretary of the Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis Howard Mendelsohn, along with GRPO officers and Treasury 

analysts, met with senior officials from the UAE's State Security 

Department (SSD) and Dubai's General Department of State Security 

(GDSS) to discuss suspected Taliban-related financial activity in 

the UAE.  Prior to these meetings, GRPO and Treasury passed to SSD 

and GDSS detailed information on the financing of the Taliban and 

other terrorist and extremist groups based in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan.“



„During the course of the two multi-hour intelligence 

exchange sessions, GRPO and Treasury analysts walked through the 

previously shared information suggesting that Taliban-related 

finance officials have visited the UAE in order to raise or move 

funds.“



„GRPO and Treasury analysts also shared 

names and phone numbers of multiple Taliban and Haqqani associates 

known either to reside in or travel to the UAE.“



„UAE security services were not familiar with the names of specific UAE-based LT members shared by GRPO and Treasury, but promised to follow up on 

the information.“



„On 06 November 2007, ARSOI coordinated 

with GRPO and scheduled a follow up interview of Subject 

detailed in RefTel who claimed to have information about the 

sale of uranium.  ARSOI began the interview and subsequently 

introduced the Subject to GRPO to answer detailed questions 

sent from GRPO headquarters.  GRPO will send detailed results 

of the interview via SepTel.“



„RSO and GRPO will continue coordinating efforts 

and wait for GRPO headquarters to determine if the 

information obtained during the interview merits additional 

contact with the Subject.“



„This National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.“



„Military and Security Issues 1) Critical Infrastructure Protection (INFR-4) 2) Military Structure and Capabilities (FMCC-4) 3) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 4) Health and Medical Developments (HLTH-4)“



„There are opportunities in the area of security cooperation, too. For starters, we know that Tunisia could be doing a better job in sharing intelligence with us about



TUNIS 00000492 005 OF 005



the threat of terrorism in North Africa. This was all too clear when, yet again, the GOT failed recently to share information with us in a timely fashion on a reported plot against US military personnel. GRPO has been taking steps to increase cooperation through liaison channels; while there has been progress, more is possible.“



„Tunisian cooperation in the intelligence arena has been uneven. On the positive side, we have some successful programs being run through GRPO. We also have good intelligence sharing on Tunisians who are outside the country. On the negative side, however, intelligence sharing on the threat inside Tunisia is thin, although it has improved somewhat in recent months. The improvements are probably in response to a commitment made by President Ben Ali to A/S Welch in February to cooperate on counterterrorism "without reservation."“

Statement to USA Authorities on Bradley Manning's Birthday

Statement from the 50 people who have gathered outside the USA Embassy, Reykjavik, Iceland 17th of December 2011 to show Bradley Manning solidarity on his 24th Birthday delivered to the USA Ambassador to Iceland.

Today marks the second birthday Private Bradley Manning spends in jail. He is accused of having leaked secret documents to WikiLeaks of unprecedented proportions exposing serious war crimes and how the general population in the USA and around the world have been lied to in relation to the war waged in their name.

It is obvious that Manning will not get a fair trial. The USA president Mr Obama has prior to Manning even being brought to court claimed he was guilty. Obama also said that Manning could not go unpunished the way Ellsberg, the man who leaked the Pentagon Papers, once did, because the two cases are too different. Ellsberg, who sees Manning as following in his footsteps, cannot accept this assessment. He only agrees with the president on one point: Manning disclosed secret information, he says, but "all of the pages that I released were top secret."

The US government celebrated the release of the 'Pentagon Papers' on the Vietnam War as a sign of its openness. The truth, however, is that President Barack Obama has taken a much tougher line on whistleblowers than his predecessors. It is though timely to remind him that blowing the whistle on war crimes is not a crime.

The USA Army has come under fire for keeping Manning under detention for 18 months without trial, as well as the conditions of his detention. Since his confinement, Manning has become a symbol of free speech. We second the demands of the Bradley Manning Support Network  whom have pushed for his release and the dropping of all charges against him.

Nato Parliamentary Assembly in Romania

I am currently in the Romanian Parliament in Bucharest participating in the NATO parliamentary assembly. I am in the Civic Dimension of Security Committee. A few months ago Lord JOPLING presented a report on Cyber Security. His report dealt with a wide range of topics: WikiLeaks and Anonymous were of great concern in his report, where he wove together real and serious attacks on nations such as Estonia with the threat of leaks: a very dangerous trend. Leaking information to the public domain is not an act of war, I would rather classify it a civic duty to expose war crimes.

I have not been able to find a legal way to provide changes in this biased report. I did criticize it harshly yesterday and basically said i could not support it with all its factual errors and biased perspective and attempts to make cyber attacks into something that would justify the usage of article 5. Apparently such criticism is not common here at the assembly on reports. The Lord thus offered me to send in info on factual errors. I did. I have with some great help from activists from all over the world gone through this report step by step and provided both amendments and deeper perspectives. You can download it HERE as pdf.

In the draft resolution on cyber security is no mention of the factual errors in Lord Jopling report and no proper way for me to amend those. Looking through the draft resolution on Cyber Security the following struck me with discomfort:

“9. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

1. to ensure swift implementation of the revised NATO Policy on Cyber Defence and the related cyber defence Action Plan, adopted in June 2011, introducing the cyber dimension in all three of NATO’s core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and co operative security;
   
   

We are URGED to ensure swift implementation of: revised NATO Policy on Cyber Defence and the related cyber defence Action Plan, adopted in June 2011

As this is a secret document and we will not be given access to review the policy. It is not wise for us the parliamentarians present here to ensure swift implementation of something we have not seen and will not be granted access to. It makes a mockery of the Nato parliamentary assembly to request its members to accept this process. If this is a common practice I urge all parliamentarians to abstain from participating in such an act because we cant possibly ask for legalizing something we have not been able to scrutinize and this process of accepting policies blindly is not very democratic and it does not provide the needed core information for us to have debate and offer political guidance and authority.

Thus I have requested that we will delete sub-paragraph 9.a in the draft resolution on Cyber Security unless we be given prior access to NATO Policy on Cyber Defence and the related cyber defence Action Plan, adopted in June 2011.

No one has chosen to do a report on the findings in the Afghan War logs. I will ask if my committee would be willing to do that at this assembly, there are not many like minded parliamentarians at the assembly and thus harder to get a Rapporteur status. I will keep on trying.

Here is the entire draft resolution:

Civil dimension of security

209 CDS 11 E

Original: English

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

DRAFT RESOLUTION

on

CYBER SECURITY

presented by

Lord JOPLING (United Kingdom)

General Rapporteur

The Assembly,

1. Recognizing the benefits offered by the cyber domain to our societies as well as to the defence and security sector, including opportunities for greater situational awareness and co ordination among the armed forces of the Allies as well as for the Alliance‘s public diplomacy;

2. But also concerned with the emergence of a new category of threats that target national information infrastructures, and that could seriously undermine the security interests of the Alliance and its member states;

3. Anxious that cyber defence capabilities and awareness of cyber threats vary significantly across NATO member states thereby weakening the Alliance’s overall cyber security;

4. Welcoming the decisions made by the leaders of the Alliance at the NATO Lisbon Summit and the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in June 2011, identifying cyber security as one of the key priorities of the Alliance;

5. Saluting NATO’s approach aimed at expanding its cyber defence policy to include centralized cyber protection of all NATO bodies and the use of NATO’s defence planning processes in the development of the Allies’ cyber defence capabilities. ;

6. Believing that, in view of the growing scope and severity of cyber attacks, in addition to exploiting fully the opportunities offered by Article 4, the potential application of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in case of a serious cyber attack against the Alliance or its individual members, should not be ruled out;

7. Noting that legislative “black holes” still exist both at a national level and in terms of international law when it comes to setting security standards for the cyber domain;

8. Emphasizing that stricter security regulations for the cyber domain should not come at the cost of reduced civil liberties and rights, such as freedom of speech and the right to communicate over the Internet, and noting the key role of the Internet in mobilizing democratic movements in authoritarian countries;

9. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

a. to ensure swift implementation of the revised NATO Policy on Cyber Defence and the related cyber defence Action Plan, adopted in June 2011, introducing the cyber dimension in all three of NATO’s core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and co operative security;

2. to promote domestic awareness of cyber threats, taking into account lessons learned from milestone events including the cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007 and against Georgia in 2008 as well as the emergence of Stuxnet malicious software;

3. to scrutinize domestic legal frameworks, ensuring that coherent and effective laws are in place to address the evolving cyber threats;

4. to provide necessary support for the efficient functioning of national Computer Incident Response Teams, and to invest sufficiently in the training of national cyber security experts;

5. to promote closer partnerships between governments and the private sector in order to ensure the security of government networks and improve the exchange of expertise in case of a breach of security;

6. to ensure that the introduction of additional security measures in the cyber domain are accompanied by adequate mechanisms of parliamentary and public oversight over their respective government institutions;

7. to support international efforts to develop universal norms of acceptable behaviour in the cyber domain that would ban the use of cyber attacks against civilian targets, promote exchange of best practices and establish mechanisms of international assistance to stricken nations, while ensuring full universal access to the Internet as a venue for the exchange of ideas and information;

8. to ensure that adequate attention is paid to the physical protection of networks, including undersea fiber-optic infrastructures;

10. URGES relevant NATO bodies:

1. to ensure that NATO Computer Incident Response Capability is fully operational by the end of 2012, and that NATO’s cyber defence services are centralized;

2. to facilitate, if requested, national efforts of NATO member states to acquire adequate cyber defence expertise and state-of-the-art technologies;

3. to test the efficacy of NATO and member states’ cyber defence efforts through NATO’s periodic international exercises, and to ensure that these exercises are fully funded, staffed and well-attended;

4. to use capabilities such as NATO Cyber Defence Management Board and NATO Co operative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, to analyze rapid developments further in the cyber domain and to develop strategies for strengthening cyber defences across the Alliance, while exploiting the advantages of the information age through initiatives such as NATO Network Enabled Capability;
5. to develop efficient co-operation mechanisms with the relevant EU institutions, with the particular aim of supporting the EU’s legislative efforts to establish robust cyber security standards across the private sector;

6. to increase assistance, if requested, to NATO partner countries in the field of cyber security, particularly by sharing best practices and raising awareness of cyber threats.

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